


The Calculus of Consent



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著者:James M. Buchanan

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The Calculus of Consent was co-authored by Buchanan with Gordon Tullock, with whom Buchanan collaborated on many books and academic enterprises throughout their careers. As Robert D. Tollison states in the foreword, “[this book] is a radical departure from the way democracies conduct their business. The Calculus is already a book for the ages.”

This classic work analyzes the political organization of a free society through the lens of the economic organization of society. The authors acknowledge their unease as economists in analyzing the political organization, but they take the risk of forging into unfamiliar territory because they believe the benefits of their perspective will bear much fruit.

As the authors state, their objective in this book is “to analyze the calculus of the rational individual when he is faced with questions of constitutional choice We examine the [choice] process extensively only with reference to the problem of decision-making rules.”

The authors describe their approach as “economic individualism.” They believe that economists have explored individual choice extensively in the market sector while social scientists have largely ignored the dynamics of individual decision-making in the dynamics of forming group action in the public sector.

Written in the early 1960s, The Calculus of Consent has become a bulwark of the public choice movement for which James M. Buchanan is so justly famous.

作者介绍:

James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.

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标签

political

economy

评论

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书评

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_49275b420100ag5w.html 各位亲爱的同事：
我知道戈登·塔洛克(Gordon Tullock)将从乔治·梅森大学退休，不久的将来，他会搬到亚利桑那州图森市（Tucson）与他姐姐和她的家人们一起住。所以现在是时候让我们向塔洛克致以崇高的敬意和由衷的感...

公共政策的决策成本与外部成本 2001年09月06日 中国宏观经济信息网

文/中国人民大学行政管理学研究所 毛寿龙

任何公共政策的决策，都需要或多或少的成本。一般来说，公共政策的决策成本与参与决策的人数成正比，也就是说参与决策的人越少，公共政策的决策成本...

这是一部公认的经典，是建立公共选择理论的第一次尝试。在书中，作者分析了立宪民主的逻辑基础问题，并试图建构一种规范理论来描述和解释社会用来协调各种利益冲突的手段。其基本假定是：方法论的个人主义、“经济人”和政治交换。作者把集体行动视为一种减少由纯粹的私人行动...

作为开创性著作，本书主要是提出问题和指明方向。 p4

公共选择理论将个人的行为判断延伸到公共政策之上。 p62

考察了一些基本的概念，设立了立宪经济学的基础。 p120

对于多方讨价还价的研究很重要。 p122

（对政府的最优规模的研究，实际上是对老子的小国寡民思想的具体化和...

关于政治与经济决策中可能存在的相同之处的分析，在很多方面确实相当巧妙和有趣，不过，我还是要提请大家深入思考一下这一分析可能存在的弱点。在我看来，就我们所见到的这些研究者们现阶段成果来看，这一分析似乎没有对该分析所使用的基本概念预先给出一个准确的界定。一边...

2020—19！ 看待事物的视角不同，会对事物有不同的理解。

如果将社会经济现象理解为秩序，那我们研究的范式将是“交换”；如果将其理解为实现某种目的的手段，那我们范式将是“最大化”——在给定约束条件下资源最佳配置以达到最大化效用。布坎南的公共选择学派超越传统的政治...

这本书的副标题是“立宪民主的逻辑基础”，作者在书里运用模型和数学工具（或者说经济学方法）分析了一些民主选择的模型，他的假设就像经济学中个人追求利益最大化一样，是在政治活动中追求个人效用最大化，通过个人的理性分析做出选择。

我重点想要介绍一下的是，通过这本书我...

大概看了下思路. Political philosophy is about what the political institution should be, and the political economics is about how that is going to be put into practice. Why there should be political institution rather than individual contracts, because there...

才开始看这本书。想问各位大侠，现在民主政治中这么多问题。怎么没有现实版的运用民主决策理论分析呢。比如经济金融理论中，各方面专家的分析。比如把公共管理思想，一般分析方法，运用到对现实新闻事件分析中去的東西。一定有，我想这本书所蕴含的思想，观点，一定有其现实的...

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