


The Strategy of Conflict



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著者:Thomas C. Schelling

出版者:Harvard University Press

出版时间:1981-5-15

装帧:Paperback

isbn:9780674840317

A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory-the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.

作者介绍:

Thomas Crombie Schelling (born 14 April 1921) is an American economist and professor of foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis."

Schelling received his bachelor's degree in economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1944. He received his PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1951.

He served with the Marshall Plan in Europe, the White House, and the Executive Office of the President from 1948 to 1953. He wrote most of his dissertation on national income behavior working at night while in Europe. He left government to join the economics faculty at Yale University, and in 1958 he was appointed Professor of Economics at Harvard. In 1969 he joined the Kennedy School at Harvard University. Dr. Schelling taught for twenty years at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, being the Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, as well as conducted research at IIASA, in Laxenburg, Austria between 1994 and 1999.

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标签

博弈论

经济学

国际关系

战略

政治

经济

政治学

Economist

评论

看着一本原以为是国际政治范畴的书突然出现了微分方程@@查了一下作者才知道是诺贝尔经济学奖得主。。。

我觉得真的很有意思，这样的书的存在再次说明文理同源。就像数学学到最后会变成天体物理再回归哲学，动态博弈，在脱离了经济学理想模型的实际运用里与社会学是多么不谋而合。是有趣的灵感。

重点是要别人相信，其实还是一个『欺骗』问题

开创的提出了聚焦效应、多重均衡、动态均衡

favorite of the year!

毫无疑问，谢林深入浅出的文字并不是给不具备思辨能力的人阅读的。

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书评

用了一个星期吃奶的劲儿读了一半，再不想脑细胞继续无谓的牺牲，就此作罢。不是因为原书有多么的深邃，而是译者的汉语言水平着实让我惊叹。译者本应是我和原作者之间的桥梁，而其却挖了一个深不见底的大坑，将我俩相隔两岸。此坑如此之深，让我不得不怀疑是否是人类所为，亦...

谢林的书有多经典就不谈了，这里就谈谈翻译有多恐怖吧，意思完全就翻译反了，妈蛋看毛线啊。随便拉一段出来：It may, for example, have to put a penalty on the carrying of weapons rather than their use; on suspicious behavior rather than observed misdemeanors; on...

据说这本书很牛，能获得诺贝尔经济学奖，道长都推荐，肯定很牛。可是读起来就感觉不是那么回事，举例拿出来的数学模型看不懂，收益矩阵图看不懂，就连文中正常的表述都看不太懂，看得我都有点怀疑自己的智商了，豆瓣上对这本书的内地译本是一篇骂声，都说内地的翻译把这本书给...

看完书后，有这种不一样的感觉：原来国际关系、军事斗争还有政治安排，原来都有“冲突的战略”在里面左右。作为“博弈论”的先驱，谢林先生的思想高深而又全面，可他通过事例却把这个理论说的清楚、了然。要说感想，可能需要再看几遍才能形成自己的思想。翻译的质...

谢林的书总是用鲜活的例子，甚至有些就发生在我们的日常，来佐证一个深刻的道理。好的社会科学著作往往能够刷新你对社会的原有认知，并且使自己的眼界豁然开朗，生活变得有趣一些。
冲突的战略的中文版的缺憾在于，由于翻译问题，总是在我们阅读到最重要部分时变得难以理解。这...

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