


Principled Agents?

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THE LINDAHL LECTURES



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著者:Timothy Besley

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What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley's intriguing Lindahl lectures. Economic analyses of government usually divide into two broad camps. One which emphasizes government as a force for public good that can regulate markets, distribute resources and generally work towards improving the lives of its citizens. The other sees government as driven by private interests, susceptible to those with the power to influence its decisions and failing to incentivize its officials to act for the greater public good. This book adopts a middle way between the two extremes, the Publius approach, which recognizes the potential for government to act for the public good but also accepts the fact that things often go wrong. It shares the view that there are certain institutional preconditions for effective government but then proceed to examine exactly what those preconditions are. Timothy Besley emphasises that it is not just about designing an appropriate institutional framework but also about understanding the way incentives work and the process by which the political class is selected.

作者介绍:

Timothy Besley, Professor of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics

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标签

政治经济学

经济学

政治学

economics

politics

经济

比较政治

民主

评论

Besley的一大贡献在于放松politician完全自利的假设，允许政客具有intrinsic motivation(为人民服务的动机)因而政客存在好坏之分，把selection引入electoral accountability的研究框架。本书大致是对此理论的一个早期介绍，并不是综述。如果

把2005 JEP文章对政治选拔的讨论结合起来就更好了。When thinking about political institution, always take incentive together with selection in mind. #入了个大坑#
2017.12.26

这书真不错， a must-read for political economy.

暑假撸完

整体来说，一本温吞，不太引人入胜的书。政府的作用，不该被过度的美化或期望，也不该一味的看到为己谋私所以觉得它不应该存在，更好的制度让它更多地发挥好的作用吧。

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书评

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