

Discourses



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著者:Machiavelli

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Few figures in intellectual history have proved as notorious and ambiguous as Niccolo Machiavelli. But while his treatise "The Prince" made his name synonymous with autocratic ruthlessness and cynical manipulation, "The Discourses" (c.1517) shows a radically different outlook on the world of politics. In this carefully argued commentary on Livy's history of republican Rome, Machiavelli proposed a system of government that would uphold civic freedom and security by instilling the virtues of active citizenship, and that would also encourage citizens to put the needs of the state above selfish, personal interests. Ambitious in scope, but also clear-eyed and pragmatic, "The Discourses" creates a modern theory of republic politics. Leslie J. Walker's definitive translation has been revised by Brian Richardson and is accompanied by an introduction by Bernard Crick, which illuminates Machiavelli's historical context and his new theories of politics. This edition also includes suggestions for further reading and notes.

作者介绍:

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) was a Florentine statesman who was later forced out

of public life. He then devoted himself to studying and writing political philosophy, history, fiction, and drama.

目录: First Book

- 1.What have Generally Been the Beginnings of Some Cities, and what was that of Rome
- 2.Of the Kinds of Republics There Are, and of which was the Roman Republic
- 3.What Events Caused the Creation of the Tribunes of the Plebs in Rome, which Made the Republic More Perfect
- 4.That Disunion of the Plebs and the Roman Senate Made that Republic Free and Powerful
- 5.Where the Guarding of Liberty is More Securely Placed, Either in the People or in the Nobles; and which have the Greater Reason to Become Tumultuous Either he who Wants to Acquire or he who Wants to Maintain
- 6.Whether it was Possible to Establish a Government in Rome which Could Eliminate the Enmity Between the Populace and The Senate
- 7.How Much the Faculty of Accusing [Judiciary] is necessary for a Republic for the Maintenance of Liberty
- 8.As Much as Accusations are Useful to a Republic, So Much So are Calumnies Pernicious
- 9.How it is Necessary for One Man Alone in Desiring to Organize a New Republic to Reform its Institutions Entirely Outside the Ancient Ones
- 10.As Much as the Founders of Republics and Kingdoms are Laudable, So Much are Those of a Tyranny Shameful
- 11.Of the Religions of the Romans
- 12.Of How Much Importance Should Be Given Religion; and How Italy, Because the Medium of the Roman Church was Lacking, Was Ruined
- 13.How the Romans Served themselves of Religion to Establish the City and to Carry Out their Enterprises and Stop Tumults
- 14.The Romans Interpreted the Auspices According to Necessity, and with their Prudence Made a Show of Observing Religion, Even when They Were Forced not to Observe It, and If Anyone Recklessly Disparaged it They Punished Him
- 15.How the Samnites had Recourse to Religion as an Extreme Remedy for the Things Afflicting them
- 16.A People Accustomed to Living Under a Prince, If by Some Accident Becomes Free, Maintains its Liberty with Difficulty
- 17.A CORRUPT PEOPLE COMING INTO THEIR LIBERTY CAN MAINTAIN ITSELF FREE ONLY WITH THE GREATEST Difficulty
- 18.In what Way in a Corrupt City a Free State Can Be Maintained, If There is One There, or If not, How to Establish It
- 19.A Weak Prince who Succeeds an Excellent Prince Can Be Maintained, but Any Kingdom Cannot Be Maintained If a Weak One Is Succeeded by Another Weak One
- 20.Two Continuous Successions of Princes of Virtu achieve great Results; and that well organized Republics of necessity Have Successions of Virtu; Therefore their Acquisitions and Expansions are Great
- 21.How Much Blame that Prince and Republic Merit who Lack their own Arms
- 22.What is to Be noted in the Case of the Three Roman Horatii and of the Three Alban Curatii
- 23.That one ought not to put in Peril all his Fortune and all his Forces; and because of this the Guarding of Passes is Often Harmful
- 24.Well Organized Republics Establish Rewards and Penalties for their Citizens, but Never Compensate One [At the Expense] Of the Other
- 25.Whoever Wants to Reform an Ancient State into a Free City, Should Retain at Least a Shadow of the Ancient Forms

26. A New Prince in a City or Province Taken by Him ought to Organize Everything Anew
27. Very rarely do Men know how to be entirely Good or entirely Bad
28. For what Reasons the Romans Were Less Ungrateful to their Citizens than the Athenians
29. Which is More Ungrateful, a People or a Prince
30. What Means a Prince or a Republic ought to Use to Avoid this Vice of Ingratitude, and what that Captain or that Citizen ought to Do So as not to Be Touched by it
31. That Roman Captains Were Never Extraordinarily Punished for Errors Committed; Nor Were They Yet Punished When, by their Ignorance or Bad Proceedings Undertaken by them, Harm Ensued to the Republic
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33. When an Evil has Sprung up Either Within a State or Against a State, it is a More Salutory Proceeding to Temporize With it than to Attack it Rashly
34. The Dictatorial Authority Did Good and not Harm to the Roman Republic; and that the Authority which Citizens Take Away, not Those are Given them by Free Suffrage, are Pernicious to civil Society
35. The Reason why the Creation of the Decemvirs in Rome was Harmful to the Liberty of that Republic, notwithstanding That it was Created by Public and Free Suffrage
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37. What Troubles the Agrarian Law Brought Forth in Rome; and How Troublesome it is to Make a Law in a Republic which Greatly Regards the Past but Contrary to the Ancient Customs of the City
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40. The Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what is to Be noted in It; and where it Will Be Considered Among Many Other Things How a Republic Can Be Saved or Ruined Because of Similar Accidents
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47. Men, Although They Deceive themselves in General Matters do not Deceive themselves in the Particulars
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52. To Reprimand the Insolence of a Powerful One who Springs up in a Republic, There is No More Secure and Less Troublesome Way than to Forestall Him Those Ways by which he Comes to Power
53. The People Many Times Desire their Ruin, Deceived by a False Species of Good: And How Great Hopes and Strong Promises Easily Move them

54. How Much Authority a Great Man has in Restraining an Excited Multitude [Mob]
55. How Easily Things are Managed in that City where the Multitude is not Corrupt, and that where There is Equality a Principality Cannot Be Established, and where There is None a Republic Cannot Be Established
56. Before Great Events Occur in a City or a Province, Signs Come which Foretell them, or Men who Predict them
57. Together the Plebs are Strong, Dispersed They are Weak
58. The Multitude is Wiser and More Constant than a Prince
59. Which Alliances or Leagues Can Be Trusted, Whether Those Made with a Republic or Those Made with a Prince
60. How the Consulship and every other Magistracy in Rome ought to be [Bestowed] Without Any Regard to Age

Second Book

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2. With what People the Romans had to Combat, and How Obstinate They Defended their Liberty
3. Rome Became a Great City by Ruining the Surrounding Cities and Admitting Foreigners Easily to Her Honors
4. Republics have had Three Ways of Expanding
5. That the Changes of Sects and Languages, Together with the Accident of Deluges and Pestilence, Extinguished the Memory of Things
6. How the Romans Proceeded in Making War
7. How Much Land the Romans Gave Each Colonist
8. The Reason why People Depart from their National Places and Inundate the Country of Others
9. What Causes Commonly Make Wars Arise Between the Powerful
10. Money is not the Sinew of War although this is common opinion
11. It is not a Prudent Proceeding to Make an Alliance with a Prince who has More Reputation than Power
12. Is it better, fearing to Be Assaulted, to carry out or await War
13. That One Comes from the Bottom to a Great Fortune More by Fraud than by Force
14. Men Often Deceive themselves Believing that by Humility They Overcome Haughtiness
15. Weak States are Always Ambiguous in their Resolutions, and Weak Decisions are Always Harmful
16. How Much the Soldiers in Our Times are Different from the Ancient Organization
17. How much the Army ought to esteem the Artillery in the Present times, and if that opinion that is generally had of it Is True
18. That Because of the Authority of the Romans and by the Example of Ancient Armies, the Infantry ought to Be More Esteemed than Cavalry
19. That Acquisitions in Republics not well Organized and that do not proceed according to Roman Virtu, are the ruin and not the Exaltation of them
20. What Perils are Brought to that Prince or that Republic which Avails Itself of Auxiliary and Mercenary Troops
21. The First Praetor which the Romans sent any place was the Capua, four hundred years after they had begun to make War [Against that City]
22. How Often the Opinions of Men in Judging Things [To Be] Great are False
23. How Much the Romans, in Judging the Matters for Any Incident that Should Necessitate Such Judgment, Avoided Half-Way Measures
24. Fortresses are Generally More Harmful than Useful
25. That the Assaulting of a Disunited City in Order to Occupy it by Means of its Disunion is an Error
26. Contempt and Insult Generate Hatred Against Those who Employ them, Without

Any Usefulness to them

27.To Prudent Princes and Republics, it ought to Be Enough to Win, for Often it is not Enough If They Lose

28.How Dangerous it is for a Prince or a Republic, not to Avenge an Injury Made Against the Public or a Private [Citizen]

29.Fortune Blinds the Minds of Men when she Does not Want them to Oppose Her Designs

30.Truly Powerful Republics and Princes do not Purchase Friendship with Money, but with Virtu and Reputation of Strength

31.How Dangerous it is to Believe Exiles

32.In How Many Ways the Romans Occupied Towns

33.How the Romans Gave their Captains of Armies Uncontrolled Commissions

Third Book

1.To Want that a Sect or a Republic Exist for Long, it is Necessary to Return them Often to their Principles

2.How at Times it is a Very Wise Thing to Simulate Madness

3.How it was Necessary, in Wanting to Maintain the Newly Acquired Liberty, to Kill the Sons of Brutus

4.A Prince Does not Live Securely in a Principality While Those who have Been Despoiled of it Live

5.That which Makes a King Lose the Kingdom that was Inherited by Him

6.Of Conspiracies

7.Whence that when Changes Take Place from Liberty to Slavery, and from Slavery to Liberty, Some are Effected Without Bloodshed, and Some are Full of it

8.He who wants to alter a Republic ought to Consider its Condition

9.How One Must Change with the Times, If he Wants to have Good Fortune Always

10.That a Captain Cannot Avoid an Engagement If the Adversary Wants to Do So in Every Way

11.That he who has to Do with Many, Even Though he is Inferior, as Long as he Resists the First Attack, Wins

12.How a Prudent Captain ought to Impose Every Necessity for Fighting on His Soldiers, and Take them Away from the Enemy

13.Where One Should have More Confidence, Either in a Good Captain who has a Weak Army, or in a Good Army which has a Weak Captain

14.What Effects the New Invention and New Voices have that Appear in the Midst of Battle

15.That an Army Should have One, and not Many, in Charge, and that Many Commanders are Harmful

16.That True Virtu is Difficult to Find in Difficult Times, and in Easy Times it is not Men of Virtu that Prevail, but Those who have More Favor Because of Riches or [Powerful] Relation

17.That One who has Been Offended ought not to Be Placed in Any Administration and Government of Importance

18.nothing is More Worthy of a Captain than to Penetrate the Proceedings of the Enemy

19.Whether Obsequies are More Necessary than Punishment in Ruling a Multitude

20.An Example of How Humanity Did Influence the Faliscians More than All the Power of Rome

21.Whence it Happened that Hannibal, with a Different Method of Proceeding than Scipio, Achieved the Same Result in Italy as the Latter [Did in Spain]

22.How the Harshness of Manlius Torquatus and the Humanity of Valerius Corvinus Acquired the Same Glory for Each

23.For what Reason Camillus was Driven Out of Rome

24.The Prolongation of [Military] Commands Made Rome Slave

- 25.Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and Many Roman Citizens
- 26.How a State is Ruined Because of Women
- 27.How a Divided City is to Be United, and How that Opinion is not True which Supposes that it is Necessary to Keep a City Disunited in Order to Hold it
- 28.That the Actions of Citizens ought to Be Observed, for Many Times a Beginning of Tyranny is Hidden Under a Pious Act
- 29.That the Faults of the People Arise from the Princes.
- 30.For a Citizen who Wants to Do Some Good Deed in His Republic on His own Authority, it is First Necessary to Extinguish Envy; and How the Defense of a City ought to Be Organized on the Coming of the Enemy
- 31.Strong Republics and Excellent Men Retain the Same Courage and Dignity in Any Fortune
- 32.What Means Some have had to Disturb a Peace
- 33.In Wanting to Win an Engagement, it is Necessary to Make the Army have Confidence Both in themselves and in their Captain
- 34.What Fame or Voice or Opinion which a People Make Begins to Favor a Citizen; and Whether They Distribute the Magistracies with Greater Prudence than a Prince
- 35.What Dangers Occur in Making Oneself Head in Counselling a Thing, and How Much the Danger Increases when it is an Extraordinary Thing
- 36.The Reason why the Gauls have Been, and Still Are, Judged at the Beginning of a Battle to Be More than Men, and Afterwards Less than Women
- 37.Whether Skirmishes Before an Engagement are Necessary, and How to Recognize a New Enemy If They are Avoided
- 38.How a Captain ought to be Constituted, in whom in Army can confide
- 39.That a Captain ought to be one having a Knowledge of Sites
- 40.That to use Deceit in the Managing of a War is a Glorious Thing
- 41.That One's Country ought to Be Defended, Whether with Ignominy or with Glory, but it Can Be Defended in Whatever Manner
- 42.That Promises Made by Force ought not to Be Observed
- 43.That Men Born in a Province Observe for All Time Almost the Same Natures
- 44.Impetuosity and Audacity Many Times Can Obtain that Which, with Ordinary Means, Can Never Be Obtained
- 45.What is the Better Proceeding in Battle, Either to Sustain the First Shock of the Enemy, and Having Sustained it, Hurl them Back, or Rather to Assault Him First with Fury
- 46.Whence it Happens that a Family in a City for a Time, have the Same Customs
- 47.That for the Love of His Country, a Good Citizen ought to Forget Private Injuries
- 48.When a Good Error is Seen to Be Made by the Enemy, it ought to Be Believed that it is Done Under Deceit
- 49.A Republic Wanting to Maintain Itself Free has Some Need of New Precautions, and it was by Such Methods that Q. Fabius was Called Maximus

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标签

Machiavelli

政治哲学

政治

意大利

哲学

politics

Philosophy

思想史

评论

The noble lie

NM的政治学非常自然生态。。。

10分!!!!!!
读完了!!!!!!爽!!!!!!

Democracy

Short term的war和long
term的constitution是很理性了。希望人们做决定能真的用prudence。

远超君主论的神作

发现大一的时候已经读过另一版本了，感觉马基雅维利主义其实是biased and corrupted。The discourses（好像）是他死后才广为传播的，这才是他心中的理想社会-republic. 那为什么马基雅维利主义只用来指代他在prince中的论点而不是discourses中的论点呢

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书评

【按语：马基雅维利的《论李维》通过评注李维的史书《自建城以来》，以夹叙夹议的方式进行史论，考察了古罗马建城以来的伟大政治宏业及其经验教训，其间特别比照了古罗马的尊严荣耀和今日意大利的凋敝沉沦。共3卷，卷1考察了罗马共和时期官方的谋略和决策；卷2考察了罗马建立大...

【按语：马基雅维利（1469-1527）将《君主论》（1512）献给佛罗伦萨的统治者Lorenzo de' Medici。《君主论》是《论李维》的一个分支或较小的姊妹篇。小清新，很简单。就其谋略论述而言，与亚里士多德《政治学》卷4-6差不多是异曲同工，并不更让人心惊胆战。在区分了共和国和...

来源：华夏时报 时间：2013年1月30日 美国加州圣玛利学院教授 徐贲
所谓“宪政”，宪就是法，政就是治，宪政也就是法治。任何一个共和国都有缔造者和初始时刻，共和国的开创者以立法来奠定它的宪政制度。美国人把缔造他们民主共和制度的先贤们称为“建国之父”，他们...

这部作品用大量的史实，赞颂罗马共和国的优良制度和罗马贵族、人民的德行。与近代作品相比，它不是建构在人文精神、道德的基础上，而是奠基基于功利主义。马基雅维利绝不人云亦云，观察、剖析历史角度独特、深刻锐利，象一把锐利的手术刀，常有惊世骇俗观点，然而细细品味确有其...

毁誉参半的奇书 聂文聪

巴克纳·比·特拉维克说：“人们经常断章取义以证明作者道德沦丧，这种做法对于马基雅维利的整个论题来说有失公平和公正。我们必须承认，他将国家利益提升到了个人利益之上。”

莎士比亚称这本书的作者为“阴险狡诈、口是心非、背信弃义、残暴无情的...

在本书中，马基雅维利以自己由现实政治状况引发的思考注解了李维的罗马史，从而重新建构出一套罗马城邦政治体系的金字塔式结构。

这套金字塔式结构的核心，便是马基雅维利所认为的“三制合一”的政体，即君主制、贵族制和民主制混合的政体。这种关于政体的观念， ...

马基雅维利(公元1465年～1527年)与韩非(公元前280年～前233年)都是世界政治思想史上伟大的政治思想家。尽管他们生活的时代各异，地域不同，但他们都生活在一个社会大变革的时代。

马基雅维利生活在意大利封建割据、四分五裂、内忧外患、朝代更迭的时代。当时的意大利半岛上，有...

by企鹅君

作为政治学历史上的一位巨人，马基雅维利自己的政见究竟是什么样的？他到底是君主制还是共和制的拥护者？这个问题成为了古往今来许多马基雅维利研究者争论的核心问题之一。但是我想，马基雅维利本人对于此问题可以说不甚关心。借用费耶阿本德的一句话，“什么都行（...

在《论李维》中，马基雅维利极端推崇罗马的体制（或者说德行），并且希望在当时的意大利推行这样的体制。（这点在《君主论》中表现得尤为强烈。）

他一反被众多人所接受的观点（当然这点也在《君主论》中更为明显），但是事实上也是更有效的。“认为谦卑可以战胜傲慢的人，往...

三、政策论:国家利益至上

马基雅维利与韩非子政治思想的第三个显著相同之点在于:在治理国家的政策选择上，前者认为国家利益高于一切，后者认为，君主利益高于一切。政治技巧和策略是马基雅维利政治思想的重要组成部分。马基雅维利是坚定的国家至上主义者，他认为，无论是为...

真正的德行只在危难之时显达；太平时代的得势者不是贤达，而是富贵门第。在太平岁月，共和国对伟人奇才视而不见，过去如此，今后仍将如此。在这样的时代，许多公民嫉妒他们因自己的德行而获得的威望，不想和他们平起平坐，而是要充当他们的上司。……共和国的这种弊病造成...

当一个文明产生了法家，代表着这个文明已经度过了他繁荣的盛夏，开始出现了收割者。韩非子之于中国，马基雅维利之于意大利，皆是如此。两人的比较历来是学术的热点。比起用心的险恶和腹黑，显然马氏不及韩非一趾，正如最专断的欧洲君主亦不及秦皇汉武一趾。但论及理论深度和思...

读后感：一个说法是，不读论李维无法知道一个完整的马基雅维里。但是接续在君主论之后，再看这本史论，却感觉两本书呈现出来的并非是一个分裂的马基雅维里，在某种程度后者使得前者更加的完整。《论李维》是马基雅维里几乎与君主论同时写的一本书，主要是根据李维罗马史的前十...

我认为马基雅弗利的厉害之处在于：他能让未亲身经历过这些事情的人觉得他说的是如此的理所当然和符合逻辑。同时，这也说明了我们现在这个时代与他们的相似（起码从政治哲学上来说）：人们没有底线，以结果论英雄，卑劣无耻但能达到目的的手段被奉为信条。这样方能解释为何我会...

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