


Being Realistic about Reasons



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著者:T. M. Scanlon

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T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.

作者介绍:

T. M. Scanlon received a BA from Princeton in 1962 and a PhD from Harvard in 1968, in between studying for a year at Brasenose College, Oxford. He taught at Princeton from 1966 until 1984, and at Harvard since that time. Scanlon is the author of many articles in moral and political philosophy, and of three books: *What We Owe to Each Other* (Harvard University Press, 1998), *The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy* (CUP, 2003), and *Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame* (Harvard University Press, 2008).

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标签

哲学

ethics

伦理学

Philosophy

元伦理学

normative

实践基础

reason

评论

跟Korsgaard, Williams, Harman等人关于reason的对话非常精彩，对internal reason和external reason这个哲学伪命题的诊断也简明。An effective defense of cognitivism in metaethics.

看了第一部分，很cheap但也确实有效的消解形而上学方案，和近年兴起的easy ontology旨趣相同。

一盘大棋，如何不用康德的方法谈实践理性和行动的规范性。

小册子，但既不简约也不简单，论证密度极大，没有大家小书常见的凝练晓畅感，因为

不避枝蔓，在理由基础主义的形而上学疑难、实践重要性说明、认识论问题以及理由的强度和可选择性特征说明这一主线下对欲望理论、康德式建构主义、表达主义，威廉斯、考思佳、吉巴德等各路主张作了回应，也因此，不少子题分散在全书中，有时觉得挺乱。虽然立场鲜明，对其他理论路线也作了全面但简略的回应，但要说多透彻、多有说服力也不见得，不如说是对各种理论路线作了更精确的澄清，挑明了彼此分歧究竟在哪，在七个得分点（p. 3）上各自得失几何。而所谓realistic，似乎指自己的理由认知主义立场不强求某种追根究底、十足可靠的说明，很温和、很有界限感，贴近常识实实在在（p. 2, p. 123）。

想翻译

一百来页构筑了一个完整一致的元伦理系统，回应了几乎所有该领域的主要问题。再仔细铺展一下主要论点就更好了，感觉写成五百页都不过。

如果说元伦理学是汪洋大海，那这份作品就是其中最高的浪尖之一。短短百多页探讨了元伦理学领域内几乎所有的重要问题，基于理由基础主义立场，并着重回击了建构主义（Korsgaard、O'Neil、Rawls）和基于欲望的主观主义（很多论证应该是从帕菲特那里得到了启发）；基于实在论立场回击了表达主义乃至规范表达主义（Gibbard）；承继卡尔纳普和奎因的相关学说提出领域多元论，和一种robust naturalistic realism（Enoch）拉开距离，并回应古怪性挑战和随附性挑战；借用罗尔斯的反思平衡模型为强认知主义奠基，同时为（部分的）道德多元论提供可能。唯一美中不足的就是对外在主义的回应太少（真正的回应其实只有一段），借Davidson的理论轻飘飘地打过了太极.....

展开辩护一套理由基础主义实在论，整齐规范得体、浅显精炼全面，还很updated，感觉特别厉害这么一个讲稿（好似终于有人直接顺着Putnam指出的"epistemic values are also values"往下讲了讲（p. 35）

reasons fundamentalism

1.
对规范性事实的本体论和规范性的认识论和确定性的讨论尤其富有启发性，从数学哲学那里寻求的对于规范性事实的独立性和确定性的支援虽然深刻但并不那么令人信服。这一方面还有继续探讨的巨大空间。 2.
对理由的强度的讨论显示出作者的犹豫不决，这显示出前面的讨论并没有很好的解决理由的规范性问题。实际上这是理由理论中最难啃的一块。 3.

我怀疑很多文句的语法是错误的，无法弄明白句子成分的句子到处都是。有时，这使我的阅读体验十分糟糕。当然，这可能是因为我自己的语言能力不济。

一本非常可敬的小册子，斯坎伦在一系列metaethics问题跟其他大家（尤其Williams、Korsgaard、Harman）的对话不可不谓精彩——虽然我依旧不能赞同Scanlon的这种（reason）realism。

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书评

本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成，薄薄一本，除开首尾非正文部分，只有123页，却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义，到形而上学和知识论，斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文，有时读起来感觉他已步...

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