


Action in Perception



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著者:Alva Noe

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"Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In *Action in Perception*, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought -- that perception is a kind of thoughtful activity. Touch, not vision, should be our model for perception. Perception is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skillful activity of the body as a whole. We enact our perceptual experience. To perceive, according to this enactive approach to perception, is not merely to have sensations; it is to have sensations that we understand. In *Action in Perception*, Noe investigates the forms this understanding can take. He begins by arguing, on both phenomenological and empirical grounds, that the content of perception is not like the content of a picture; the world is not given to consciousness all at once but is gained gradually by active inquiry and exploration. Noe then argues that perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession and exercise of practical bodily knowledge, and examines, among other topics, the problems posed by spatial content and the experience of color. He considers the perspectival aspect of the representational content of experience and assesses the place of thought and understanding in experience. Finally, he explores the implications of the enactive approach for our understanding of the neuroscience of perception.

作者介绍:

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标签

心灵哲学

哲学

现象学

分析哲学

theory

perception

艺术心理学

评论

本书想要达成的目标是，一方面给经验和意识一个自然主义的解释，另一方面又不至于为了解释而违背经验在现象层面的特征。为此，作者提出了所谓“生成”进路：知觉与其说是将外在对象在心灵中巨细无遗地表象出来，不如说是一种探索的活动，其基础在于对知觉偶然性的样态（如此动，则感觉会如此变化，等等）的潜在知识。这样一来，作者就用“链接”这种似真的在场取代了全适的在场，从而反驳了知觉的马赫式观点，强调了可能性在知觉中的建构性地位。然而，作者仍预设了知觉中某种框架的存在，只是把其中的单元从细节的表象换成了有关通达该细节之可能性的知识；换言之，他早已知道对象有这些细节，此后才去追问它们以何种方式在场，因而不能彻底地揭示世界在知觉中逐渐展开的过程。知觉在此并不具有首要地位，它只是对某个既成的形式框架的明知故问的探索。

虽然长得像打手心思倒是很细腻，很多细节具有深刻反思性，并不做空洞地冒进，很好地结合了欧陆和英美并能在行文上保持清晰和准确，对不同理论的逐条反驳气势可谓排山倒海。不足是过于按照自己的论证顺序而忽视了成书后的分布顺序导致经常需要返回去看，结构性不够。几个分问题（空间、色彩、视角、知觉概念）都很精彩。但不得不说noe的知觉观有点过度实在论，因而他那里的身體和生物学意义的身體几乎没有区别故否定存在personal和subpersonal这一区分因而危险地忽视了人的第一视角锁定问题。最末的神经科学问题还得重看，还不是很明白

原来知觉研究的externalist和internalist出自这个领域！我喜欢这个理论发自内心！可是sensorimotor contingencies没有考虑mental action让心里觉得不太爽。

乏善可陈

看出作者尤其喜欢维特根斯坦了

不能认同，但有其价值。其实，这本书说的也很简单，就是你的认知无法脱离你的行动，所以它才叫action in

perception。延续了瓦雷拉，浙大李恒威等人的生物认知进路，核心观点是就是行动与认知的动态耦合，也是对传统认知的有力反驳。

也许是唯一一个能够在包容度上与“打通中西马”并肩的，同时按照学院风格写就的书。
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书评

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