


Being No One



[Being No One 下载链接1](#)

著者:Thomas Metzinger

出版者:MIT Press

出版时间:2003-1

装帧:HRD

isbn:9780262134170

According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing

process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In *Being No One*, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.

作者介绍:

Thomas Metzinger is Professor of Philosophy at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany. He is the editor of *Neural Correlates of Consciousness* (MIT Press, 2000).

目录:

[Being No One_下载链接1_](#)

标签

哲学

心灵哲学

是我需要的内容，但是好啰嗦哦

分析哲学

toc德国

Philosophy

Cognition

评论

若不是他写书废话太多，我倒真的很想像我自己赞扬Steven
Pinker那样去赞扬他一番，就Thomas
Metzinger的学识造诣而言。 anyway，事实也是如此。

一小步

[Being No One 下载链接1](#)

书评

[Being No One 下载链接1](#)