


# The Private Sector in Public Office



[The Private Sector in Public Office\\_ 下载链接1](#)

著者:Yue Hou

出版者:Cambridge University Press

出版时间:2019-10

装帧:Paperback

isbn:9781108705530

This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China's private sector manages to grow without secure property rights, and proposes a new theory of selective property rights to explain this phenomenon. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews, a unique national survey of private entrepreneurs, two original national audit experiments and secondary sources, Professor Yue Hou shows that private entrepreneurs in China actively seek opportunities within formal institutions to advance their business interests. By securing seats in the local legislatures, entrepreneurs use their political capital to deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments. In doing so

they create a system of selective, individualized, and predictable property rights. This system of selective property rights is key to understanding the private sector growth in the absence of the rule of law.

作者介绍:

Yue Hou is Assistant Professor in the Political Science department at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research interests include political economy and authoritarian politics, with a regional focus on China. Her work has appeared in the Journal of Politics, the Journal of Experimental Political Science, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, and Social Science Quarterly, and has been featured in the New York Times and the Boston Review. She also writes articles for Chinese media outlets including the Southern Weekly and Tencent ipress.

目录: 1. Introduction  
2. Selective property rights  
3. Private entrepreneurs in legislative office  
4. Motivations to run  
5. Protection from predation  
6. Legislator status and political capital  
7. Conclusion.  
• • • • • (收起)

[The Private Sector in Public Office 下载链接1](#)

标签

比较政治经济学

政治学

中国研究

人大研究

产权制度

中国经济

英文

## 评论

很好的博论切入点。要解释中国经济增长，就绕不开对民营企业的产权保护。本书着眼于民营企业在产权保护不完善的威权制度下的发展，讨论了中国民企采取何种策略来克服制度上的不利条件从而保护自己的产权。答案是：中国的私营企业家积极地在能够保护他们商业利益的正式政治制度内寻找机会。通过在地方立法机构占有席位，企业家利用他们的政治资本来阻止地方官员索要贿赂、特别税收和其他形式的非正式支付。在这样做的过程中，企业家创造了一套个人化地（individualized）、有选择性且可预测的产权体系。经验层面定性和定量的结合也饶有趣味。

-----  
我其实希望这本书能有400页。

-----  
侯老师非常精彩的一本书。私营企业家用informal/formal的方式寻求进入formal制度，进而获取informal connection，最终实现对自身利益的保障。

-----  
私营企业家如何在威权国家保护他们的私有产权呢？作者发现在中国，私营企业家可以通过进入人大政协来发射一个昂贵的信号，让低层级的官僚认为这些私营企业“背景深厚”，因而更少侵扰这些“红顶商人”。真正意义的实证检验是第五章和第六章最后的实验，作者汇报进入两会的私营企业家交更少的捐款，打着两会代表旗号去联系地方政府，也更可能得到回复。实证上，作者也承认第五章有比较强的内生性，而且也无法去除：毕竟随机分配的人大代表就不可能是昂贵的信号了，它内生于企业家讳莫如深的政商关系。我对本书最大的担忧是它的理论。作者似乎混淆了两种情况：在进入两会前已经有政治联系（这是signal model）以及进入两会后认识了官员，形成了政商网络（这不是signal model）。作者的理论是前者，但实证支持的是后者。

-----  
那肯定要给五星的吧~选题特别有意思，量质化的东西都做得不错欸结合得也很好……总算要出来了

-----  
[The Private Sector in Public Office 下载链接1](#)

书评

-----  
[The Private Sector in Public Office\\_下载链接1](#)