


# Truth, Knowledge and Causation



[Truth, Knowledge and Causation\\_ 下载链接1](#)

著者:C. J. Ducasse

出版者:Routledge

出版时间:

装帧:

isbn:9781138909007

Originally published in 1969. This book examines the fundamental concepts of metaphysics and of theory of knowledge. Topics treated include the nature of substance and of causation; their relation to natural laws, dispositions, and attributes; the nature of consciousness and purposiveness; of symbols, signs, and signals, and their relation to interpretation and objective reference; and the nature and criteria of truth.

The author holds that philosophy is by intent a science and that its becoming so requires precise and non-arbitrary semantical analysis of basic philosophical terms. He argues that philosophy then, like the other sciences, has practical importance: in its case this consists in its capacity to give to difficult practical decisions not only the efficacy insured by its application of the findings of the other sciences, but in addition some of the wisdom which is philosophy's distinctive ultimate aim.

作者介绍:

目录: Preface vii

I. On the Nature and the Observability of the Causal Relation I

2, On the Analysis of Causality 15

3 • Causation: Perceivable? Or only Inferred? 21

4 • Concerning the Uniformity of Causality 29

5 • Explanation, Mechanism, and Teleology 36

6. On the Attributes of Material Things 42

7 • 'Substants', Capacities, and Tendencies 61

8. Symbols, Signs, and Signals 73

9 • Objectivity, Objective Reference, and Perception 90

10. A Liberalistic View of Truth 132

II. Propositions, Truth, and the Ultimate Criterion of Truth 150

12. Propositions, Opinions, Sentences, and Facts 179

13. Moore's 'The Refutation of Idealism' 192

14. Philosophy and Natural Science 218

15 • The Method of Knowledge in Philosophy 238

. . . . . ([收起](#))

[Truth, Knowledge and Causation\\_下载链接1](#)

标签

Causality

评论

-----  
[Truth, Knowledge and Causation\\_ 下载链接1](#)

书评

-----  
[Truth, Knowledge and Causation\\_ 下载链接1](#)