


Collective Action



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著者:Hardin, Russell

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Public choice, an important subdiscipline in the field of political theory, seeks to understand how people and societies make decisions affecting their collective lives. Relying heavily on theoretical models of decision making, public choice postulates that people act in their individual interests in making collective decisions. As it happens, however, reality does not mirror theory, and people often act contrary to what the principal public choice models suggest. In this book, Russell Hardin looks beyond the models to find out why people choose to act together in situations that the models

find quite hopeless. He uses three constructs of modern political economy--public goods, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and game theory--to test public choice theories against real world examples of collective action. These include movements important in American society in the past few decades--civil rights, the Vietnam War, women's rights, and environmental concerns. This classic work on public choice will be of interest to theoreticians and graduate students in the fields of public choice, political economy, or political theory--and to those in other disciplines who are concerned with the problem of collective action in social contexts.

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标签

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评论

针对奥尔森经典著作的缺陷的改进版，引入了当时风行的博弈论、有限理性和动态分析，主要是针对奥尔森的静态和单次博弈、集体收益与选择性激励截然分开、分析组织运作和维持多于组织起源、针对公共品（public good）多于公害（public bad）等问题进行论述，且引入大量新颖理论，运用了契约理论、一些制度经济学分析和非理性分析（道德的作用）等，数理推导极多。问题是行文比较松散随意，各种理论虽然都提供了有用的视角，但招之则来挥之则去，主题远不如奥尔森简洁有力，到结尾部分基本变成了契约合作理论分析。大概行文、而非内容，是本书没能比肩奥尔森之经典地位的原因。一些实证研究案例倒是值得一看，特别是对美国国会游说组织及Sierra Club等环保组织动员中的非理性因素分析。

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