


Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare



[Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare_ 下载链接1](#)

著者:Suzumura, Kotaro

出版者:

出版时间:2009-11

装帧:

isbn:9780521122559

Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrowian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enumerate the various factors that are responsible for the stability of the voluntary association of free and rational individuals. Among other topics covered are an axiomatic characterisation of the concept of a rational choice, the simple majority decision rule and its extensions, the social choice implications of the concept of equity as nonenvy, the constrained majoritarian collective choice rules and the conflict between the Paretian ethics and the libertarian claims of individual rights.

作者介绍:

目录:

[Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare_ 下载链接1](#)

标签

社会选择

公共选择

EconSen

评论

[Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare_ 下载链接1](#)

[Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare_下载链接1](#)