


# Consciousness, Color, and Content



[Consciousness, Color, and Content\\_ 下载链接1](#)

著者:Michael Tye

出版者:A Bradford Book

出版时间:2002-2-7

装帧:Paperback

isbn:9780262700887

Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive matter, something more widespread in nature than higher-order or reflective consciousness, it is deeply puzzling. In 1995 Michael Tye proposed a theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. Tye's focus is broader than representationalism, however. Two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In part I of this book, Tye suggests that these challenges are intimately related. The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. Part II of the book is devoted to representationalism. Part III connects representationalism with two more general issues. The first is the nature of color. Tye defends a commonsense, objectivist view of color and argues that such a view is compatible with modern color science. In the final chapter, Tye addresses the question of where on the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases, arguing that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such relatively simple creatures as the honeybee.

作者介绍:

目录:

[Consciousness, Color, and Content\\_下载链接1](#)

标签

心灵哲学

哲学

mind

认知科学哲学

PhilosophyOfMind

Philosophy

-

# 评论

写论文时选的主要参考文献。吸引我的地方就是Tye很强的reductive representationalism。够简洁，够干净。但这本书里能还原的consciousness只局限于perceptual experience，不涉及其他的心灵状态（比如信念，情感，而这一类的心灵状态又不是以phenomenal character为区分的）。总体来说，Tye的论证还是比较精致的，在intensionality of phenomenal talk的论证（来自Chisholm的“看谈”）中对non conceptual的强调，是我觉得最符合直觉也最关键的地方。

-----  
[Consciousness, Color, and Content\\_ 下载链接1](#)

# 书评

-----  
[Consciousness, Color, and Content\\_ 下载链接1](#)